



Directorate of
Intelligence

Secret

25X1

MASTER FILE COPY

DO NOT GIVE OUT

ALL INFORMATION

Egypt: The Roots, Values, and Attitudes of the Officer Corps

25X1

A Research Paper

State Dept. review
completed

DIA review
completed.

Secret

*NESA 82-10112
March 1982*

Copy **315**

25X1

Page Denied



Directorate of
Intelligence

Secret

25X1

Egypt: The Roots, Values, and Attitudes of the Officer Corps

25X1

A Research Paper

*Information available as of 31 March 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.*

25X1

This paper was prepared by

Office of Near East-South Asia

Analysis. A contribution was made by

Office of Central Reference. Comments and

queries are welcome and may be directed to the

Chief, South Asia Division, NESA,

This paper has been coordinated with the Directorate
of Operations, the Office of Central Reference, and
the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and
South Asia.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

NESA 82-10112
March 1982

Secret

25X1

**Egypt: The Roots,
Values, and Attitudes
of the Officer Corps**

25X1

Overview

Since the coup that toppled the monarchy in 1952, and especially since Egypt's defeat by Israel in 1967, the Egyptian military has become increasingly depoliticized at the command level. The Egyptian officer corps has shown itself to be a stable, disciplined, and professional force, loyal to the regime of President Hosni Mubarak, despite the involvement of a small group of junior officers in the assassination of President Sadat.

25X1

In an attempt to establish a base for examining the prospects for continuing military loyalty, this study examines the social and economic backgrounds of the officer corps, the informal power networks within the corps, its corporate identity, and its place in Egyptian society. The analysis explores the grievances of the officers and assesses the possibility that they could be co-opted by civilian enemies of the regime.

25X1

The middle class makeup of the officer corps contributes to its stability by imparting a degree of uniformity to its social, economic, and political goals. The internal cohesion of the corps is enhanced by its ethnic and religious homogeneity. A system of personal alliances based on kinship and patron-client relationships that strengthen the bonds both among officers and between them and the civilian rulers serves as an additional stabilizing mechanism. Presidents Nasir, Sadat, and Mubarak have all manipulated these networks to defuse the development of military power centers in opposition to them.

25X1

A strong corporate identity also underpins the internal cohesion and stability of the officer corps despite the growth in its size and complexity over the past 30 years. The corps' defense mission and its roles as a guarantor of political order and as a personnel pool for the country's political leadership have created a cohesiveness unmatched by any group in Egyptian society. Interservice and intraservice rivalries do not appear to threaten the cohesion of the officer corps. The professionalism of the corps is enhanced by a system of promotion by merit and by an extensive education and training program.

25X1

Secret

25X1

As a result of peace with Israel, national priorities have been oriented increasingly toward meeting domestic needs rather than military requirements. Officers are unhappy with the regime's inability to acquire all the equipment and training needed to stem the decline in Egypt's military capabilities. The decline in morale has not reached the danger point but could, over the long run, undermine the loyalty of the armed forces. The failure of military pay to keep pace with inflation is the main issue for most officers. Military allowances and benefits are no longer a significant bonus, and officers believe they have lost ground to civilians because of the economic liberalization policies introduced by Sadat. []

25X1

Sadat's assassination in October 1981 by a small group of Muslim extremists, which included some young Army officers, illustrates the vulnerability of the officer corps to influence from the ideologies of the civilian opposition. The more senior officers generally favor the secularist policies initiated by Nasir. Many served most of their careers under Nasir and have retained residual sentiment for his policies if not his tactics. Junior officers, who have largely served since the military defeat by Israel in 1967 spurred a general return to more fundamental Islamic values, are more susceptible to the rhetoric of the Islamic fundamentalists. []

25X1

Any threat to the stability of the armed forces, and ultimately to military support for Mubarak, is likely to have roots in problems affecting Egyptian society at large. Egyptian officers are members of middle class, close-knit, extended families, and they share many of the same concerns of their civilian kin. If Mubarak or a successor fails to make headway in resolving the country's seemingly intractable economic and social problems, the resulting discontent among the Egyptian people could combine with Islamic fundamentalist fervor to spark widespread civil unrest. Such circumstances, added to mounting grievances among military officers over pay, benefits, and status, could set the stage for military intervention. []

25X1

Secret

Secret

25X1

25X1

25X1

If a military coup occurs within the next five years, it most likely will be led by senior officers. The class and corporate cohesion of officers at this level and the respect for command that persists among senior and older middle-level officers form the basis for this judgment. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the unwieldy size of the officer corps, moreover, will discourage action by younger officers during this period and limit their support. A government led by today's senior officers would almost certainly reflect secularist values and continue to pursue a nonaligned foreign policy. At the same time it would maintain close, but correct, relations with the United States. [REDACTED]

25X1

Over the longer term, a military takeover would more probably be led by today's junior officers—by then middle-level officers with direct command over troops. As members of the post-1967 generation, these officers would be less inclined to follow the secularist policies of the senior command. A government led by this group would probably be more sympathetic to Islamic principles and would most likely pursue a domestic and foreign policy course less favorable to US interests. [REDACTED]

25X1

Secret

25X1

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Overview	iii
The Changing Role of the Armed Forces: A Historical Perspective	1
Social and Economic Background	1
The Officer Corps: The Rising Middle Class	1
Noncommissioned Officers: A Lack of Mobility	2
The Personal Dimension of Military Stability: Peer Groups and Power Networks	2
Nasir	3
Sadat	4
Mubarak	4
The Officer Corps: Its Corporate Identity	5
Professionalism	6
The Officer's Career	6
Education and Training	6
Self-Image	7
Political and Economic Values	8
Political Role	9
Generational Differences in Attitude	10
Interservice Rivalries	11
Intraservice Rivalries	11
Political and Economic Concerns: The Grievances Mount	11
Bread-and-Butter Issues	13
Corporate Grievances	13
The US Connection	14
Suborning the Officer Corps: Influence of Opposition Groups	14
The Religious Opposition	15
The Political Opposition	17
Outlook	18
 Appendixes	
A. Checklist of Military Support Indicators	21
B. The Egyptian Armed Forces: A Brief History	23
C. Military Officers in Egyptian Cabinet Posts	27

25X1

Secret

25X1

Egypt: The Roots, Values, and Attitudes of the Officer Corps

25X1

The Changing Role of the Armed Forces: A Historical Perspective

The coup that brought the military to power under Gamal Abd al-Nasir in July 1952 followed a centuries-old pattern of military assumption of political leadership and control over the civilian bureaucracy. For the first time in modern history, however, the new military rulers were native Egyptians with roots in the rural middle class, not foreign invaders. Because of the control exerted by Great Britain after 1882, the Army had had no significant role in the national independence movement in the first quarter of the 20th century. By the mid-1930s, however, the expansion of the Army's military academy to include newly urbanized lower middle class youths resulted in a new breed of officers highly politicized against first the British and later the monarchy. It was a group of these officers who carried out the coup in 1952.

25X1

The resulting "presidential republic," though dominated by Nasir, was highly dependent on the officer corps as a whole. Because the monarchy and the traditional political parties had been destroyed or discredited, Nasir had to rely on the armed forces to implement his policies. By placing former Egyptian military officers in most of the major civilian posts, Nasir thrust the Army into a role much like that of a political party. Reflecting its political importance, the military assumed a preeminent position in Egyptian society.

25X1

Creation of a large military force to meet the Israeli threat bolstered Nasir's foreign policy ambitions. The growing size of the military bureaucracy encouraged Nasir's use of its organizational and fighting skills in the union with Syria (1958-61) and the intervention in the Yemeni civil war (1962-67). By the late 1960s Egyptian defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP had quadrupled, and the size of the armed forces had more than sextupled since 1952.¹ (See table 1.)

25X1

¹ Defense expenditures reached a peak in 1972 when they measured an estimated 15 percent of GNP and 33 percent of government spending. Since that time, defense expenditures are estimated to have dropped to 6 percent of GNP and 16 percent of government expenditures.

25X1

The overt political role of the military changed considerably after 1967 as a result of the Army's poor performance in the Six-Day War. Through extensive purges, Nasir depoliticized the military command, reduced the presence of former officers in civilian government, and increased the Soviet military advisory presence. Although the Army retained its position as the source of ultimate power, the military command had less direct influence on nonmilitary policy. Despite increased prestige under President Sadat after the "success" of the October War in 1973, the military has continued its "behind-the-scenes" role. As Egypt's ultimate powerbroker, however, the military remains the key to the country's political stability.

25X1

Social and Economic Background

The Officer Corps: The Rising Middle Class. Today's Egyptian officer corps is a solidly middle class organization. Its members share the concerns of their counterparts in the civilian bureaucracy and in other middle class professions. This was not always the case. Entrants into the military academy before the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 (which signaled Egypt's move toward independence from Great Britain) were all from the upper class. The post-1936 group, in contrast, came largely from newly urbanized lower middle class families. Urbanization meant that the new cadets had been exposed to secular education rather than the religious schooling typical for those of peasant background. The European-modeled schools in Cairo and Alexandria were often centers of nationalist agitation, and cadets developed a political awareness at an early age. Throughout the 1940s increasing numbers of Egyptian officers were the sons of civil servants, low-level bureaucrats, teachers, and other functionaries of the salaried middle class. By 1952 the aristocratic elements in the officer corps had all but disappeared.

25X1

Secret

Table 1

**Egyptian Armed Forces:
Personnel Strength 1950-80**

	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980
Army	60,000	76,000	84,000	175,000	170,000	300,000	350,000
Navy	7,000	7,000	8,000	10,000	16,000	18,000	20,000
Air Force	4,000	4,000	4,000	11,000	17,500	25,000	27,000
Air Defense Command ^a					30,000	80,000	80,000
Armed Forces total	71,000	87,000	96,000	196,000	233,500	423,000	477,000
Paramilitary force ^b	21,000	31,000	23,000 ^c	21,000	21,000	51,000	64,500
Total	92,000	118,000	119,000	217,000	254,500	474,000	541,500

^a Established in late 1969.^b The paramilitary forces are under Army command; this includes the Frontier Corps, Security and Guard Forces, the National Guard, and the Coast Guard.^c The Palestine Brigade was transferred from the paramilitary forces to the Army in 1960.

25X1

The middle class character of the Egyptian officer corps has influenced its goals. The Free Officers who led the coup of 1952, for example, had no place in the Egyptian society of King Farouk and thus had no stake in its survival. After the coup the aristocratic elite was replaced by a new middle class elite. The new regime's program of radical reform to destroy the economic power of the landowning aristocracy mostly served the needs of the middle class. [redacted]

the sons of lower class parents. The great majority lack a secondary school certificate, the key to upward mobility in Egypt. These class and educational differences cannot easily be bridged; even the few noncommissioned officers who have secondary school certificates rarely become commissioned officers, and they often lack the middle class social connections that are essential for advancement within the officer corps. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Ethnically and religiously, the officer corps is only slightly more diverse. It is overwhelmingly Arab and Muslim. There are small minorities, particularly Copts and Nubians, but their representation in the armed forces is lower than that in the overall national population and is concentrated in particular units. For example, Copts, who make up roughly 7 percent of Egypt's population, are represented in a much smaller proportion within the military. They are concentrated in the medical corps. The highly specialized commando units are reported to have a particularly heavy concentration of Nubians. [redacted]

The Personal Dimension of Military Stability: Peer Groups and Power Networks

The military, like Egyptian society generally, functions through a system of personal alliances based on complex patterns of interest perception and group identification. The hierarchical nature of the military and its increasingly professional character have weakened these traditional structures to some degree. The interests and status of a group or individual, however, are still largely determined by clique and patron-client relationships. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Noncommissioned Officers: A Lack of Mobility. Although most commissioned officers now have a middle class upbringing, most noncommissioned officers are

Secret

Secret




Figure 1. The original 11 Free Officers and General Naguib

25X1

The personal ties that underpin these relationships arise in three basic environments: the extended family or kinship group; the *shilla*, or peer group formed through associational contacts; and the *dufaa* or "old-boy network" that forms within an educational context. A *dufaa* includes all those graduated in a particular subject or faculty in the same year. The most famous military *dufaa* is that of the military academy graduating class of 1938, which included eight of the 11 Free Officers involved in the coup of 1952. These networks are neither permanent nor exclusive but fluctuate in response to changing perceptions of individual or group interest, thereby creating continual realignments and overlapping relationships. The links forged by these shifting patterns are a stabilizing element in both society and the military because they blur group differences and head off potentially divisive fragmentation.

part in shaping Egypt's modern history by contributing to the military stability that sustains the regime's viability.

25X1

Nasir. Nasir relied heavily on the traditional networks created by kinship, *shilla*, and *dufaa* to extend and consolidate his rule after the 1952 coup. As the networks expanded and became more diffuse, however, power centers outside the military emerged, chiefly in the Arab Socialist Union headed by Vice President Ali Sabri, in the internal security services under the direction of Sharawi Gumma, and in the special presidential security network under Sami Sharaf.

25X1

In order to balance these competing power centers, Nasir intervened on a continuing basis to encourage or restrain rivalries. By manipulating these groups, Nasir presided over a system that, for all its radical intent, functioned according to the rules of traditional society. For example, Nasir used Army Chief of Staff Col. Abd al-Hakim Amer's strong personal alliances within the military to ensure the continuing loyalty of the armed forces during the early years of the Free

During the last 30 years, decisionmaking in Egypt has been almost exclusively the prerogative of one man—the President. His ability to use traditional social processes has permitted an accretion of power to the presidency, making it the most effective civilian political institution. The President's manipulation of personal alliances in the military has played an important

Secret

Secret




Figure 2. President Sadat surrounded by Vice President Mubarak, Minister of Defense Abu Ghazala, and the Commanders of the Army, Air Force, Air Defense, and Navy [redacted]

Liaison ©

25X1

Officers' régime, when discontent within the Army threatened to undermine the new government. In cementing this loyalty, however, Amer created a military power center so strong that it ultimately posed a threat to Nasir's leadership. After the military defeat in 1967, Nasir eliminated Amer and his clients through an extensive purge of the military. [redacted]

25X1

Sadat. Sadat outstripped his predecessor in his use of traditional techniques to establish himself as Egypt's supreme powerbroker. He effectively thwarted an early threat from the formidable alliance of power centers that had formed the basis of Nasir's support and systematically began to build his own client network within the military. Just as Nasir's purge of the armed forces after 1967 established his supremacy over the military, Sadat's purge of high-level Nasirist officers in the "Corrective Revolution" of 1971 set the stage for his uncompromising control over the military bureaucracy. [redacted]

25X1

Sadat skillfully used a variety of techniques to control both the civilian and military leaderships. He took advantage of personal antagonisms when he made key appointments, particularly in the early years of his

administration. Within the military, for example, the individual named as Minister of Defense would often be at odds with the person appointed as Chief of Staff, thereby maintaining balance through tension. Sadat also rotated his top advisers frequently to curb their political strength and detach them from their immediate power bases. Potentially troublesome military figures were given posts in the civilian bureaucracy or the diplomatic service to thwart the growth of power centers in the armed forces. Saad al-din Shazli, former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and a charismatic figure within the military, for example, was made an ambassador after he and Sadat disagreed over the conduct of the October War. After 1973 Sadat grew more trusting of his military leaders and no longer relied so heavily on adversarial methods to maintain his dominance. [redacted]

25X1

Mubarak. During his six years as Vice President, Mubarak proved no less a master than Sadat at manipulating personal rivalries and power networks

Secret

Secret

for his own political ends. Mubarak's skill in this respect may be enough to ensure his leadership in Egypt for some time. For the near term the circumstances of Sadat's death and the problems facing Egypt appear to be working in Mubarak's favor, encouraging his supporters and detractors to close ranks for the sake of political stability. []

25X1

After his appointment as Vice President in April 1975, Mubarak worked to undermine all other contenders for the presidency. His unquestioned loyalty to Sadat enabled him to act, with the President's compliance, to manipulate some of the most impressive members of the ruling elite in and out of high-level positions. The ouster of three key cabinet members—Prime Minister Salim, Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi, and Minister of Defense Gen. Muhammad Abd al-Ghani Gamassy—consolidated his influence in the internal security services, the armed forces, and the Foreign Ministry. []

25X1

The highly personalized nature of loyalty that prevails in the armed forces has meant that Mubarak, like Nasir and Sadat before him, has had to make special efforts to install reliable supporters in key military positions. Within Mubarak's own service, the Air Force, this has not been difficult. Former Air Force Commander Shakir Abd al-Munim was handpicked by Mubarak, as was the former Air Force Chief of Staff Muhammad Shabana, a close Mubarak friend.

25X1

[] Following Abd al-Munim's death in April 1980, Shabana moved up to become Air Force Commander. Mubarak had no difficulty in naming another close friend, Muhammad Abd al-Hamid Helmi, as Chief of Staff. Mubarak also ensured that the Navy was in reliable hands. As part of his feud with former Defense Minister Gamassy, Mubarak used his influence with Sadat to replace Gamassy's choice to head the Navy with his own man. []

25X1

25X1

Establishing personal support in the Army has presented more of a problem for Mubarak. His relationship with Kamal Hasan Ali, his handpicked successor to Gamassy as Minister of Defense, did not always go



Figure 3. President Sadat, Vice President Mubarak, and Minister of Defense Abu Ghazala reviewing the military parade prior to Sadat's assassination on 6 October 1981 []

Liaison ©

25X1

smoothly. Mubarak convinced Sadat to move Ali to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in May 1980. Ahmad Badawi, then Chief of Staff, moved up to become Defense Minister. Mubarak apparently believed Badawi would be more accommodating to his wishes than Ali had been. Badawi's death in a helicopter crash in March 1981, however, led to the appointment of former Chief of Staff Muhammad Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala as his replacement. It is not clear to what extent Abu Ghazala is indebted to Mubarak for his advancement. Since Sadat's assassination the two men seem to have forged an effective alliance. Abu Ghazala is a popular and powerful figure in the Army and could emerge as Mubarak's principal rival in the long run. []

25X1

The Officer Corps: Its Corporate Identity

The mission of the armed forces to defend the country from external and internal threats, together with its vital political role and shared political and economic values, has created a corporate identity unmatched by any group in Egyptian society.² Although having more class cohesion today than before 1952, the officer

² Corporate identity is used in this paper to imply a consciousness as a separate group in society. []

25X1

Secret

corps' corporate identity has been diminished by the growth in size and complexity of the armed forces. Overall, however, generational differences and interservice and intraservice rivalries do not appear to threaten the basic cohesiveness of the corps, although they are potentially destabilizing. [REDACTED]

25X1

Professionalism. Western military observers agree that the Egyptian officer corps is by far the most professional in the Arab Middle East. In addition to battlefield experience, its professionalism is enhanced by a system of promotion by merit and by a large and diversified education and training program. These have instilled expertise, discipline, and a sense of national accountability in the officer corps to a degree unequaled by any other professional group. Egyptian officers, moreover, have become increasingly more professional under the spur of Nasir's and Sadat's desire to develop the largest and most sophisticated military force in the Arab world. [REDACTED]

25X1

The Officer's Career. The Egyptian military prides itself on being a meritocracy. In the past 30 years the appointment of Col. Abd al-Hakim Amer as the Armed Forces Chief of Staff after the 1952 coup is the sole instance of disregard for rank in a high-level appointment. Even though position, not rank, determines who carries political clout within the officer corps, those who hold important positions by virtue of patron-client relationships with members of the senior command cannot be expected to be promoted out of turn. US military observers note that senior military officers are sensitive to charges of nepotism and take great pains to conceal any hint of it. [REDACTED]

25X1

The institutional discipline required to maintain a bureaucratic meritocracy has facilitated an esprit de corps and elitism not found in the corresponding civilian bureaucracy. Officer career ranks are well defined and based on seniority and merit; an officer must spend a specific minimum time in each rank and pass examinations in order to succeed to the next level. Only when the rank of brigadier general is reached does an officer advance through merit ratings without examinations; thereafter, not dissimilar from Western militaries, promotion is tied not only to competence but also to patron-client relationships. [REDACTED]

25X1

Secret

Education and Training. An impressive education and training program has helped solidify the corporate identity of the Egyptian officer corps. Despite the growth of the officer corps from an estimated 6,000 in 1952 to 40,000 today, strong bonds of loyalty are maintained among Egyptian officers who are graduates of the same military academy.³ Military training that brings officers together, particularly those from the same service and especially the same branch of each service, further solidifies the officers' corporate identity. Interservice ties are established only among the more select group of officers (less than 10 percent) who attend the advanced staff colleges.⁴ (See table 3) [REDACTED]

25X1

Officers receive an education comparable to that of their civilian counterparts. All must acquire an undergraduate degree. A large number of commissioned officers are university graduates who spend one year in the military academy before they are commissioned. Master's degrees and doctorates in military science are offered to more highly qualified candidates. The curriculum at all levels stresses military topics but also includes academic and management courses. It is not unusual for officers to earn advanced degrees at civilian universities in such fields as law and the sciences. [REDACTED]

25X1

Foreign influence continues to permeate the training system. Military schools are modeled on the British system, a reflection of more than 70 years of British dominance. Since World War II many officers have taken advanced training at British, US, French, Soviet, and East European military schools. Large numbers of noncommissioned officers have also been sent to branch, staff, or technical schools abroad, including the Soviet Union and the United States. [REDACTED]

25X1

³ There is also a bureaucratic significance to the academy graduating class, which becomes apparent when a new Armed Forces Chief of Staff is appointed. All officers who graduated before him at the military academies automatically tender their resignation and thereafter serve only at his request. [REDACTED]

25X1

⁴ In addition to these more formal structures, there are also informal agents of military socialization such as clubs, social and sports events, credit services, and military journals that play a significant role in building the corporate identity of active and retired military officers. [REDACTED]

25X1

Secret

Table 2

Training and Career Pattern of Army Commissioned Officers

Junior Officers				Middle-Level Officers					
Military Academy	⇨	Officer Basic Training	⇨	Company, Battery, Section-Level Experience	⇨	Battalion School	⇨	Battalion-Level Experience	⇨
Three years of schooling (one year for university graduates); commissioned 2d lieutenant		About one year at one of nine branch schools: Armor Infantry Artillery Engineering Signal Electronic Warfare Army Services Chemical Warfare Intelligence		Officers spend about six years at this level		Captains and majors attend school at each branch service		Spend seven to eight years at staff or command assignments	
Middle-Level Officers		Senior Officers							
Armed Forces Staff and General College	⇨	Brigade- and Division-Level Experience	⇨	Nasir Higher War College	⇨	Army and General Staff Experience	⇨	Retirement	
Senior captains to lieutenant colonels attend, representing the top 5 to 10 percent of officers in their grade levels		Spend seven to eight years at staff or command assignments		Senior officers attend who represent the top 2 to 3 percent of officers in their grade levels		Usually brigadier generals and above; after brigadier promotion based on "merit system" without formal written examinations			

25X1

Self-Image.

day's officers see themselves as more competent, disciplined, and open to modern ideas—particularly modern technology—than other Egyptian professionals. The training and overall career experience of Egyptian officers over the past 30 years has tended to produce highly nationalistic, secularist, and progressive-minded individuals with a strong sense of corporate identity. The officers who participated in the 1952 coup, as graduates of the armed forces professional schools, believed themselves to be members of

Egypt's new intelligentsia; they did not question their right to take the political leadership of their country from civilians and to fashion revolutionary economic, political, and social changes. The officer corps, thereafter, had the major role in carrying out the domestic and foreign policies of Nasir's regime. The military defeat by Israel in 1967 temporarily tarnished this self-image, but the performance in the October War in 1973 appears to have restored the officer corps' sense of worth and refurbished its image in the eyes of the Egyptian people as well.

25X1

Secret

Secret

Table 3

Egyptian Military Officer Colleges

	Graduates	Length of Program; Degree Conferred	Requirements	Curriculum
Junior Officer				
Military Academy (Cairo) (650-700 students per class)	Commissioned as second lieutenants in the Army—qualified to en- ter one of nine branch schools	Three years; baccalaure- ate degree in Military Science	General secondary school certificates; maxi- mum entry age 21 and a half years; Egyptian citi- zenship required of both parents and grandpar- ents; unmarried; com- petitive exam; physical fitness tests	Comprehensive undergrad- uate academic instruction; military leadership training; specific training in combat arms
Naval Academy (Alexandria) (50-100 students per class)	Commissioned as ensigns in the Navy	Four years; baccalaure- ate degree in Military Science	Similar to Military Academy	Three years of academic coursework (one year at Military Academy); fourth year shipboard training
Air Force Academy (Bilbeis—near Cairo) (50-70 students per class)	Commissioned as second lieutenants in the Air Force	Four years; baccalaure- ate degree in Military Science	Similar to Military Academy; academic average must be higher; maximum entry age 24 years for college gradu- ates; navigators must know English and pass even higher academic re- quirements than pilots	First year of general educa- tion at Military Academy; three one-year terms of theo- retical technical and scienti- fic training; Air Cadets re- ceive 250 hours of instruction

Political and Economic Values. The rigidly structured nature of Egyptian officers' careers has contributed to a sense of discipline that strongly influences their political and economic values. The officers' high appreciation of order makes them intolerant of divisive political activity by civilian interest groups. Nasir outlawed political parties, declaring that "they would divide us and create differences between us." Members of today's officer corps, who have known until recently only the one-party system, are likely to share Nasir's opinion of political parties and to favor strong, centralized leadership. Sadat's crackdown on opposition leaders was consistent with those views. Any

drastic move toward political liberalization under Mubarak, particularly if accompanied by the threat of political disorder, would probably disturb the officers and could prompt preemptive action.

Most officers would probably favor state-controlled programs for economic growth. Nasir's moves to nationalize Egyptian industry in the mid-1960s reflected his preference as a military officer for structuring the economy along centrally controlled lines. Although individual officers have taken advantage of the economic freedoms provided by Sadat's "open

25X1

Secret

Secret

Table 3 (continued)

	Graduates	Length of Program; Degree Conferred	Requirements	Curriculum
Military Technical College (Heliopolis—north-east of Cairo) (100-200 students per class)	Commissioned as first lieutenants in any one of three services; graduates are fully qualified engineers	Five years; baccalaureate degree in Military Science	Similar to Military Academy except must take more difficult competitive exams in mathematics and science	First year of general education at Military Academy
Air Defense Academy (Alexandria) (Class size unknown)	Commissioned as second lieutenants in the Army with assignments in air defense	Four years; baccalaureate degree in Military Science	Similar to Military Academy with higher requirements for science	First year of general education at Military Academy
Middle-Level Officer				
Command and General Staff College (Cairo) (Normal class size is less than 100 students)	Graduates qualified for assignment to staff positions (division-level and higher) or command at battalion or brigade level	18-month program offers a master's degree in Military Science	Middle-level officers who have already attended lower echelon service schools	Strategy and tactics—80 percent; supplemental subjects include management, international law, and economics
Senior Officer				
Nasir Academy				
Higher War College (60 students per class)	Senior officers prepared for planning and directing war operations, exercising high command in the field, and top-level staff positions in the armed forces	14-month program offers a certificate; a doctorate in Military Science is also offered and requires a four-year program with dissertation	Master's degree in Military Science or equivalent	Fields of study include national security, air defense, aeronautics, advanced strategy, and tactics; supplemental courses in management, economics, and international law
National Defense College (40 students per class)	Senior military and civilian officials prepared for national defense-related positions in government that deal with the mobilization of national resources during war	11-month program offers a certificate	Master's degree in Military Science or its equivalent	Research-oriented courses; interdisciplinary projects include domestic economic and strategic affairs

25X1

door" policies, the officer corps as a whole would probably resent substantial broadening of these policies. Indeed, the growing entrepreneurial middle class generated by the "open door" has already undercut the status of the military in society. The establishment of even greater economic freedom and reduced government control would be seen by officers as further destabilizing and not in the best interests of the armed forces or the country. []

Political Role. The key political roles that the armed forces have played in Egypt's government over the

past three decades—guarantor of political order, ratifier of political succession to the presidency, and personnel pool for the country's political leadership—are an integral part of the military's corporate identity. Any serious challenges to these roles would probably provoke a strong response from the military. []

25X1

25X1

Since 1967 the senior command has increasingly been weaned from daily involvement in running the government. The military's importance to Egypt, however,

Secret

Secret

remains critical as a source of the President's political legitimacy and the recruiting ground for key cabinet posts and the presidency. There exists, moreover, an acceptance among civilians that former military officers have the right credentials to provide political leadership. If President Mubarak's successor were to be a civilian, the military's support would be the key to his ability to stay in power. [REDACTED]

25X1

Despite the current stress on professionalism and depoliticization in the armed forces, the officer corps will almost certainly maintain its political role. The continued dominance of former military officers in key government posts is not solely the result of the preferences of the officer corps; in the absence of effective civilian political institutions, the civilian leadership has been forced to turn to the military for solutions to national problems.⁵ The "success" of the October War of 1973 has brought a newfound sense of self-confidence in the officer corps. Moreover, as the only disciplined institution that has a national focus, the officer corps is inevitably drawn to the broader concerns of the country's economic, political, and social well-being. [REDACTED]

25X1

Generational Differences in Attitude. The generational differences within the Egyptian officer corps based on foreign training have often been cited by Western observers as a potentially destabilizing element. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the differences in foreign training do not appear to have created serious cleavages in the officer corps, although they may define generational attitudes toward the United States and the Soviet Union. [REDACTED]

25X1

At present the more senior officer corps (colonel and above) is largely Soviet trained, but this situation should change after the mid-1980s. (Soviet military

⁵ While political scientists like Samuel Huntington argue that the lack of available civilian political institutions is responsible for the military's heightened political role in societies, historians and sociologists like P. J. Vatikiotis and Morroe Berger point out that in the case of Egypt the Mamluk and Ottoman traditions that predate the 19th century created the precedent for the military assumption of political leadership and control over the civilian bureaucracy. They argue that the acquiescence of civilians to military rule in Egypt has roots in the country's political culture. [REDACTED]

⁶ Generational differences based on ideology are discussed on p. 15. [REDACTED]

advisers were expelled from Egypt in 1972-75.) A significant number of junior officers are now being trained in the West, mainly in the United States. Since the signing of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty in 1979, for example, Egypt has sent some 2,700 junior and middle-level officers for training in the United States; the number is expected to be about 1,200 in 1982. [REDACTED]

25X1

US military officials report that senior and middle-level Egyptian officers praise Soviet training and the USSR's ability to supply equipment rapidly. Those officers trained both in the Soviet Union and in the United States complain that US training programs are not so well organized and lack the businesslike approach of the Soviets. On the other hand, US military observers point out that Egyptian officers trained in the Soviet Union have developed little enthusiasm for the Soviet political system or friendship for their Russian instructors. They particularly resented the Soviet elitist policy that isolated foreign students from Soviet society at large and from their Soviet counterparts. In contrast to the Soviet experience, our military observers report that Egyptian officers trained in the United States appear to appreciate the hospitality and openness of American society. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1
25X1

Secret

Secret

Interservice Rivalries. The long history of Army–Air Force rivalry has worked against a general armed forces corporate identity, but the rivalry has been kept in check by the greater size of the Army and by its control of the military high command. The Army, as the senior service, has traditionally filled the four key posts in the high command: Minister of Defense, Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and Director of Military Intelligence. The Armed Forces Chief of Staff traditionally doubles as Commander of the Army. There are no Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Army generally provides the general staff while the other services maintain separate staffs. (See figure 4) [redacted]

25X1

Resource allocations to the various services depend largely on the relationship between the service commanders and the President and Vice President. President Mubarak's former position as Air Force Chief of Staff, for example, has worked in favor of the Air Force: he has championed its cause with present and past ministers of defense, a practice that has sometimes annoyed the Army-dominated senior command. [redacted]

25X1

The Navy, the smallest and least important of the services, has almost no influence on resource allocation or on interservice senior-level assignments. The Air Defense Force, created as a separate service in response to deficiencies that became apparent in the 1967 war, was originally staffed by both Air Force and Army elements. Although officers in air defense are reported by Western military observers to have good morale, their service is still too new to have a strong institutional identity, and they currently have negligible representation in the high command. [redacted]

25X1

Intraservice Rivalries. Within each branch of the Egyptian military services—similar to the situation in other modern armed forces—there is built-in tension based on educational differences and specializations such as noncommissioned versus commissioned officer, combat officer versus noncombat officer, infantry versus armor, and university graduate versus military college graduate. [redacted]

25X1

One important intraservice rivalry that is common to all services is the phenomenon of the “technical officer” whose function as a maintenance super-

visor—similar to the US Army Warrant Officer technician—lies somewhere between that of a commissioned officer and a noncommissioned officer.⁷ Technical officer candidates attend a special institute for three years, are managed separately in the personnel system, and are selected for promotion under a different set of criteria from regular officers. Frustrated by their ambiguous role (officers without portfolio), their lack of influence on armed forces policy and politics, the ceiling on their upward mobility—they cannot go beyond the rank of brigadier general or be assigned to command positions even in combat service support units—and their perceived shoddy treatment by regular officers, who often refer to them as uncouth or uncultured, the technical officers could be a natural target for opposition groups, particularly Islamic fundamentalists. Iranian officers roughly comparable to the Egyptian technical officers played a key role in support of Khomeini during the Iranian revolution. [redacted]

25X1

Political and Economic Concerns: The Grievances Mount

The prestige enjoyed by the military in the euphoria following the October War in 1973 has gradually given way to a malaise among Egyptian military officers. The transition from war to the less urgent pace of peacetime has brought the grievances of the armed forces into sharper focus than at any time in the recent past. The decline in morale reflects an uncomfortable era of peace with Israel, a personal economic situation that has not improved, and a political and military relationship with the United States that many officers believe has produced only mixed results. Although relieved that the state of war with Israel has ended, officers are distressed by the consequences of peace and liberalization that have damaged their social and economic standing. [redacted]


25X1

[redacted] morale has become such a problem that the regime has quietly begun offering a sizable bonus to qualified senior 25X1

⁷ In the Egyptian armed forces warrant officers function as maintenance technicians, and their grievances parallel those of “technical officers.” See p. 14 for protests by Air Force warrant officers. [redacted]

25X1

Secret

Secret**Figure 4****Egyptian Armed Forces High Command**

^a Composed of President, Vice-President, civilian ministers and top military officials ; focus on the broader security issues in domestic and foreign affairs.

^b Composed of President and military officials ; focus mainly on military policy and defense strategy.

^c Both posts held by a single officer.

^d All three posts held by a single officer.

25X1

Secret

officers to retire early. Most senior officers have developed client networks among middle-grade officers with direct command over troops. By encouraging "voluntary" early retirement, the regime succeeds in removing powerful disaffected officers from their bases of power. The bonus also serves to buy off these officers and to discourage them from engaging in activities detrimental to the regime. A direct purge of disaffected elements could produce a regime-threatening backlash among both those forced to retire and their middle-level clients who remain in the service.

25X1

Studies of Third World coups indicate that military plotters often cite government corruption and economic mismanagement to justify their intervention. Attempts to overthrow a government most frequently occur when these factors are combined with a serious government challenge to the military's corporate interests. A government threat to military autonomy, internal structure, operations, or resources may be the catalyst for military action. Although Egypt is subject to social and economic pressures that could provide the backdrop for a coup, the military has experienced few challenges to its corporate interests.

25X1

Bread-and-Butter Issues. The failure of military pay to keep pace with inflation is the gut issue for most officers. Recent US Embassy reporting suggests that military allowances and benefits probably no longer give the officer an advantage over his civilian counterpart, and officers now realize that years of rising expectations for an improved standard of living are unlikely to be met. Financial strains have forced many officers, like Egyptians in the civilian sector, to hold second jobs. These outside occupations are usually pursued during regular duty hours. Although information is unavailable as to the number of hours per week officers devote to other job pursuits, a recent Egyptian Government study estimates that the average civil servant works no more than a 13-hour week at his primary job. The government has attempted to placate officers by granting pay increases and expanding benefits, but these measures provide only temporary relief.

25X1

25X1

officers, especially those of more junior grade, are frustrated and are increasingly criticizing government economic policy

as well as the profiteering and corruption that they see as having emerged as a result of economic liberalization. Corruption among senior officers generally has been regarded by junior and middle-level officers as a perquisite of rank and as such has not yet drawn particular criticism. Excessive abuses of position for personal gain, however, could become an issue in the future.

25X1

Egypt's chronic housing shortage makes it virtually impossible for young officers to find adequate and affordable places to live.⁸ (Senior officers are better off, generally, living in rent-controlled housing acquired during the Nasir era.) This problem, shared with the civilian population, forces many young officers to delay plans for marriage and raising families. Sadat authorized the construction of housing for officers in 1978 after an incident in Alexandria in which two officers unable to locate housing for their families used their platoons to seize apartments. While the ambitious building program falls far short of meeting military housing demands, it is a clear indication of government concern.

25X1

Corporate Grievances. The reorientation of domestic priorities as a result of the peace process has hurt military morale. The poor state of military preparedness, highlighted by equipment and training gaps, is probably the greatest concern.⁹ Aging Soviet equipment is not being replaced rapidly enough to maintain fighting capabilities. More than 1,000 tanks are being scrapped, for example, because they are obsolete for operational use against armor used elsewhere in the Middle East.

25X1

Officers also fear that the rapid expansion of the internal security forces after the subsidy riots in January 1977 indicated that Sadat doubted their

25X1

Secret

professional capabilities or loyalty and was seeking to develop an alternative power base. Although [] these units are not trained, equipped, or oriented to present a threat to military authority, they are natural rivals to the armed forces. Their officers receive the same benefits and salary as military officers. []

25X1

Politically motivated retirements have also led to grumbling among the officers. Forced retirements have long served to control the makeup of the senior ranks, but [] retirements between 1977 and 1979 of those officers most outspoken against the peace process were especially unsettling. Officers were further angered by the ending in 1979 of the customary promotion of a retiring officer to the next rank and the introduction in 1980 of a regulation forceably retiring lieutenant colonels and above who had not been promoted after a specified number of years in grade. In addition to its effect on morale, this latter policy has meant the loss of many officers with command and combat experience. []

Recent attempts to revise military service laws delaying promotion for Air Force warrant officers from 12 to 18 years of service led to sitdown strikes and work slowdowns at more than a half dozen airbases. The government, recognizing the potential seriousness of this type of protest, quickly suspended the law in question. This move did not assuage the demonstrators, however, and authorities were forced to court-martial some of the protest leaders among this important technical cadre. []

25X1

The US Connection. Most US military observers agree that many Egyptian officers see the military supply relationship with the United States as ineffectual in arresting the decline in Egypt's military capabilities. Accustomed to the timely arms deliveries of their former Soviet suppliers, Egyptian critics are puzzled by the long leadtime needed to acquire US equipment. They also balk at the price tag for US equipment, noting that the commercial cost for identical equipment is often less than the US Government asking price. They also question why Egypt should foot the bill for training on US equipment those US servicemen who in turn train Egyptians. []

Some officers even wonder if the United States is serious about building up Egypt's military capabilities. They charge that Egypt, unlike Israel, is treated more like a client than a friend and that the favorable US supply arrangements with Israel are not made available to Egypt. These officers believe that the United States is delaying arms deliveries until after Israel's complete withdrawal from the Sinai in order to reduce Egypt's negotiating leverage. []

25X1

US military observers also note that many officers, like other Egyptians, are unhappy with the US performance on the Palestinian autonomy issue. They are disturbed by the apparent US reluctance to exert pressure on Israel, even after Israel's bombing of Iraq's nuclear facility, the attacks on Palestinian targets in suburban Beirut, and Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights. []

25X1

25X1

25X1

Suborning the Officer Corps: Influence of Opposition Groups

The assassination of President Sadat in October 1981 by a small group of Islamic fundamentalists, some with Army affiliation, illustrates the vulnerability of the armed forces to influence from the ideologies of the civilian opposition. The Egyptian officer corps has not had extensive contact with the civilian opposition over the past 30 years. Nasir outlawed opposition political parties and used an extensive intelligence network to ensure that the armed forces obeyed his dictates. Sadat's policy of "political liberalization," which permitted the creation of a token political opposition, did not extend to armed forces personnel; they were forbidden contact with religious and political opposition groups, were monitored by an intelligence network more extensive than Nasir's, and after 1976 were denied the right to vote in national elections. []

25X1

25X1

Although most officers at all ranks are unmoved by the recruitment efforts of civilian opposition groups, officer sympathies for the ideologies of the religious or political opposition appear to reflect generational

25X1

Secret

Secret




Figure 5. Three of the four Muslim extremist assassins during the attack that killed President Sadat [redacted]

25X1

lines. More senior officers generally seem to find the secular policies of the Nasirite left preferable to those advanced by Islamic fundamentalists; they served much of their careers under Nasir and have retained a residual sympathy for his policies if not his tactics. Junior officers, on the other hand, seem more sympathetic to the rhetoric of the fundamentalists than to that of the political opposition; they have served most of their careers since 1967 when military defeat spurred the return of society to more fundamental religious values. [redacted]

25X1

The assassination of Sadat in early October and the resulting investigation indicate, however, that the extent of fundamentalist influence in the armed forces may be far greater than had been thought.¹⁰ Immediately following Sadat's death, President Mubarak and military leaders undertook a purge of military personnel thought to have connections with fundamentalists. Some observers now believe that the armed forces reflect the more religious orientation of society at large since the defeat in 1967 by Israel. More importantly, there seems to be an erosion of the [redacted] 25X1

The Religious Opposition. Despite both Embassy and press reports of increased Islamic fundamentalist activity in the Egyptian military over the past several years, most Western observers believed that only a few military personnel actively supported the fundamentalist cause and that they were under the scrutiny and control of military intelligence. This assessment seemed to be borne out during Sadat's crackdown on the opposition in early September 1981 which netted an insignificant number of military personnel connected to fundamentalist groups. [redacted]

25X1

Secret

Secret

commitment to secularism prevalent under Nasir.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] One former US military observer has heard senior Egyptian military officers suggest that this increase in religiosity may also be a consequence of the 1973 war when a religious appeal was used to prepare young commanders mentally for battle. [REDACTED]

25X1

The Egyptian armed forces are a natural target for recruitment efforts by fundamentalists who seek revolutionary change. The military is both the institutional power base of the civilian government and a potential source of arms and expertise that revolutionaries could use in subversive operations. The success of Iranian fundamentalists in neutralizing the Shah's armed forces during the Khomeini revolution has made a deep impression on Muslim fundamentalists in Egypt. [REDACTED]

25X1

President Sadat's assassination was not the first indication of military participation in terrorist activities perpetrated by Muslim extremist groups seeking to overthrow the Egyptian Government. As early as 1974, for example, civilian and military members of a group called Youth of Muhammad led an attack on the Military Technical Academy near Cairo in an attempt to capture arms for a coup. In 1977 military and civilian members of the radical Takfir Wal-Hijra (Repentance and Holy Flight) kidnaped and killed the former Minister of Religious Endowments; Egyptian authorities found the Takfir in possession of military vehicles, uniforms, and training manuals. [REDACTED]

25X1

In contrast to the more radical fundamentalist groups, the Muslim Brotherhood has a gradualist approach to an Islamic social revolution. The Brotherhood pledged not to use violence against the Sadat government [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It is believed to have had sympathizers in the military since it was outlawed in 1954. Nasir

purged the civilian, security, and military bureaucracies in the mid-1960s following an assassination attempt on his life by a Muslim Brother. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

" In "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Notes and Preliminary Findings," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, (December 1980), pp. 423-453, the author constructed a profile from a study of 34 imprisoned members of the two major radical fundamentalist groups in the 1970s, Youth of Muhammad and Repentance and Holy Flight. Despite the small sample the author's study shows that the profile of these Egyptian militants is similar to young people involved in worldwide terrorist groups such as the Red Brigades in Italy and the Mujahedin in Iran. This profile, moreover, is strikingly close to that of an Egyptian junior officer:

- Young, early twenties or early thirties.
- Rural or small-town origins.
- Middle or lower middle class backgrounds.
- High achiever.
- Upwardly mobile.
- Technical education. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1


25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

25X1



The fundamentalists have advantages over the political opposition in the competition for military recruits. Most armed forces personnel have been exposed to fundamentalist thought while attending school and may already have developed sympathy for the cause. The fundamentalists can work through traditional institutions and use religious symbolism in their recruitment more effectively than the political opposition. The political recruiters, moreover, must contend with the overall aversion of armed forces personnel to political parties.

25X1

Fundamentalist recruitment themes stressed most often to military personnel include opposition to corruption, Israeli injustices to the Palestinians, and Israeli control over Jerusalem. There are strong anti-Communist and anti-Western elements in most Muslim Brotherhood propaganda. Qadhafi and Khomeini are generally condemned, although the concept of an Islamic revolution is praised. There is, moreover, a generational difference in method between the older, more conservative Muslim Brotherhood recruiters who preach patience and the need to spread Islamic principles and the younger fundamentalists who bluntly argue a need for arms and who espouse a more active role.

25X1

The Political Opposition. Historically, Egyptian military officers have not colluded with civilian opposition political parties. There are a number of reasons for this: there was only a one-party system under Nasir, and the fledgling multiparty system of Sadat since 1976 has not been particularly successful; both Nasir and Sadat created disincentives to political activity; and few civilian political leaders have been charismatic enough to draw a following from military officers, who prefer to be led by one of their own. Additionally Sadat and other high-level military officials consistently lectured military groups to stay out of politics. Sadat also subjected candidates for the undergraduate military academies to a National Awareness Test, ostensibly to judge their nationalist sentiment but, in effect, to screen out potential political malcontents.

25X1

Some of the most energetic opposition to Sadat came from two leftist groups with substantial Nasirite compositions—the legal National Progressive Unionist Grouping (NPUG), under the leadership of Khalid Muhyi al-din, and the National Front, an organization of exiles led by Gen. Saad al-din Shazli. Khalid Muhyi al-din, an officer in the armored corps in the 1950s, is known as the Red Major for his Marxist affinities. General Shazli, a former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, war hero, and author of a book critical of Sadat, broke completely with Sadat over the Camp David peace process. 25X1

In their opposition to Sadat the Nasirites in both the NPUG and the National Front focused on his ties with the United States and Israel through the peace process. They charged that Sadat served the interests of the United States more than those of the Egyptian people; that the offer of “facilities” was in fact an offer of bases; and that Egypt would become a nuclear target with the storage of US nuclear weapons in such “facilities.” They criticized Sadat for abandoning a nonaligned foreign policy in favor of closer ties with the West, for losing the leadership of the Arab world, and for minimizing the importance of the Palestine issue. In domestic policy the Nasirites bitterly criticized Sadat’s controlled democracy. They alleged that he abandoned the goals of national production for foreign imports; that his economic policies made Egypt too dependent on capitalist countries; and that he failed to support Egypt’s Arab and Islamic heritage against the imposition of Western culture. 25X1

We believe some senior and middle-level officers undoubtedly have a residual sympathy for Nasirism and could join the Nasirite opposition, especially if present political and economic policies fail. Such officers, however, are unlikely to seek leadership in either the NPUG or the National Front but rather to turn to one of their own to lead an antiregime conspiracy. Khalid Muhyi al-din lacks influence in the officer corps, mainly because of his well-known

Secret

Secret

Figure 6. Minister of Defense
Abu Ghazala delivers the
armed forces' oath of loyalty to
President Mubarak

25X1



Wide World ©

links to Moscow. Nor has General Shazli parlayed his military background into significant support within the officer corps; his vow to bring down the Sadat government by terrorist activities was not taken seriously by most observers. His credibility has been impaired by his association with Egyptian Communists and by the financial support he has received from radical Arab states. Rumors published in the Kuwaiti press have linked Shazli and the National Front with a dissident group known as the New Free Officers, but we have not confirmed these accounts.

25X1

US Embassy observers believe that Egyptian military officers do not find the illegal Communist parties an attractive opposition alternative. Although the USSR may have recruited a small number of officers during the height of the Soviet advisory presence in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it is unlikely that these agents have recruited significant numbers of other officers. Not only is there a cultural and religious antipathy to Communism, but the Army has made a major effort to weed out Communist sympathizers. Among non-Communist parties the Socialist Labor Party, founded at Sadat's urging in the late 1970s but increasingly critical of his policies, and the New Wafd Party have pre-1952 roots and may retain small followings

among officers through familial connections. Neither, however, appears to have a significant following within the officer corps.

25X1

Outlook

Despite the steady depoliticization of the Egyptian armed forces since the defeat by Israel in 1967, the military remains a source of national unity and political legitimacy. Its response to the assassination of President Sadat was that of a stable, disciplined, and professional force. Lieutenant General Abu Ghazala, the Minister of Defense, personified the military's political role when after the assassination he swore allegiance to the new government of Hosni Mubarak.

25X1

The military role in the civilian government seems to have reached a level that is acceptable to most parties. The presence of former military officers in both the presidency and key cabinet posts allows the concerns of the armed forces to be addressed at the highest levels of government without direct involvement of the military command. Moreover, as the ultimate source of political power in Egyptian society, the military can be confident that it will play a direct role in any

Secret

Secret

future government crisis—a role that is intrinsic to its self-image and one that the civilian bureaucratic elite, however ambivalent, expects it to play. []

25X1

Despite the military's apparent satisfaction with its present political role, a military takeover of the government prompted by massive civil unrest cannot be ruled out. One or more of the following situations, when combined with a challenge to the military's corporate interests, could trigger an intervention:

- Rioting linked to economic grievances.
- A resurgence of antigovernment terrorist activity by Islamic fundamentalists.
- Political complications from the treaty with Israel and from close ties with the United States. []

25X1

Should military intervention occur in the next five years, it most likely would emanate from within the senior command. The corporate cohesion of the officer corps and the respect for command that still persists within it, particularly among senior and middle-level officers, form the basis for this judgment. The extensive government intelligence network and the unwieldy size of the officer corps, moreover, would make action difficult for younger officers who formed opposition groups during this period. []

25X1

Any government inaugurated by senior officers during this time frame would probably reflect the secularist values of a generation exposed to Nasirism; continue to resist the rhetoric of the Islamic fundamentalists; base solutions to domestic political and economic problems on a modified Nasirist philosophy; retreat from Sadat's commitment to liberalization; and give a high priority to reconciling differences with other Arab states. It would probably suspend moves normalizing relations with Israel, although it would take care not to undermine the peace treaty. Although arms and aid considerations would encourage continuation of positive ties with the United States, this relationship would be played down in favor of a more nonaligned position. []

25X1

If social and economic problems lead to massive civil unrest beyond the next five years, there is a greater likelihood that a military takeover would be engineered by today's junior officers, who will soon have

direct command over troops as middle-level officers. Two key factors point to such a scenario:

- The generationally based divisions between the senior officer cadre steeped in the secular traditions of Arab socialism and the junior officers exposed more to the recent surge of Islamic fundamentalism will be well established by the mid-to-late 1980s. The latter group's numerical strength will grow with time.
- Junior officers will suffer the most from continued poor economic prospects; senior officers have easier entry to private-sector jobs or participation in corrupt moneymaking schemes. [] 25X1

A government installed by middle-level officers would probably be more sympathetic to the fundamentalists than to the ideologies of either the West or the Communist countries. Domestic political and economic policies perceived as working against the precepts of an Islamic state would be modified or suspended. The middle-level officers would be more likely than their senior colleagues to sever ties with Israel, although they would avoid courting open hostility with the Israelis by abrogating the peace treaty. Ties with other Arab states would be strengthened, whereas ties with the United States would probably suffer. [] 25X1

An Iran-style collapse of the military in the face of internal social forces is unlikely in Egypt. Indeed, the example of Iran probably serves as a reminder to the armed forces that they underpin the stability of the Egyptian regime, a responsibility they are not likely to abdicate. A Communist coup is also highly unlikely. There appears to be only limited sympathy within the military for extreme leftist ideologies, and it is doubtful that such a regime could gain sufficient popular support to survive. [] 25X1

Secret

Secret

Appendix A

Checklist of Military Support Indicators

The following checklist has been compiled to assist Egypt watchers in monitoring those developments in the armed forces that could signify a change in the level of military support for the regime. The list is not intended to be comprehensive but rather a sampling of the types of military developments that could portend significant changes in officer loyalties. The significance of the indicators is likely to be cumulative; none should be considered in isolation.

25X1

If Egypt's current "state of peace" continues, officers may begin turning their attention toward domestic political concerns. The need to maintain stability and unity during the period following Sadat's death requires the particular loyalty of the armed forces. It may be difficult, consequently, to gauge increased politicization among the officer corps. In addition to obvious indicators such as the stridency of officer criticism of the government's foreign and domestic policies, developments that would suggest increasing politicization may include:

- Service academy curriculum changes that encourage discussion of Egypt's policies, problems, and prospects.
- Increased attendance, participation, or activity in officer organizations.
- Efforts by officers to gain the right of political association or the right to vote.

25X1

Indicators of officer dissatisfaction with their role in the political and social process could include:

- Mass resignations or early retirements.
- A significant increase in the number of officers from working-class backgrounds sufficient to weaken social cohesion. This might result from the lowering of standards for admission to the service academies.
- Widespread complaints among junior and middle-level officers over the extent of corruption in the senior ranks.

25X1

Many of these developments within the military would not be readily visible to outside observers, and it may be necessary to pay more attention to Mubarak's actions toward the military to determine the degree of support he believes he has. He will certainly continue such positive actions as pay raises and housing projects. If he believes his control over the military is slipping, he might also resort to other more traditional means to shore up his support, such as:

- Directing frequent turnovers of personnel in key commands.
- Basing officer promotion more on loyalty than on merit or seniority.
- Extensive purges through forced retirements.
- A greater-than-usual reliance on the practice of assigning popular senior officers to jobs in the civilian bureaucracy or diplomatic posts abroad.
- Efforts to divert attention of the military from domestic problems by creating external tensions.
- Increased emphasis on the military's constitutional role to defend the country from foreign threats.

25X1

The US-Egyptian relationship may prove to be an increasingly sensitive issue. British occupation was the key factor that led to the Free Officer coup in 1952. Twenty years later the Soviet presence threatened to unite disaffected officers against the regime. Today loyalty of the military could be threatened if the government remains committed to a close relationship with the United States while a sizable portion of the officer corps becomes disenchanted. Indicators would include evidence that officers are:

- Generally accepting charges that Egypt is becoming too dependent on the United States.
- Complaining that US interests are compromising the government or challenging Egyptian sovereignty.

Secret

- Carrying their criticism beyond technical or political aspects of the Egypt-US relationship and focusing on such elements of the US presence as dress, behavior, standards, values, or other facets of American culture.
- Holding the United States responsible for Israeli actions that embarrass Egypt or damage its credibility.

25X1

Before Sadat's assassination religious expression within the armed forces was a good indicator of the values and attitudes of its membership. Sadat's death at the hands of religious extremists, including one junior officer, set in motion a purge of religious extremists from the military. Government vigilance over the armed forces is likely to continue well into the future. Until it abates, religious expression within the armed forces will be too circumscribed to serve as an indicator.

25X1

In this environment Mubarak or senior military leaders might be inclined to overreact to any expression of religiosity within the officer corps. Undue suppression or restriction of public prayer or prayer meetings by genuinely moderate religious officers might incline them toward more extremist elements and underground activity. The degree of openness with which officers display their religious convictions will serve as a useful indicator of the support they have in the military establishment. Conversely, treatment of these officers, including promotions and assignments, is likely to reflect the level of concern that the regime has for renewed fundamentalist activity in the armed forces.

25X1

Secret

Secret

Appendix B

The Egyptian Armed Forces: A Brief History

The political fortunes of the Egyptian armed forces have waxed and waned over the past century and a half in response, first, to the policies of the British colonial government in Egypt and, more recently, to the domestic political climate following the coup in 1952 and the outcome of the wars with Israel in 1967 and 1973. []

25X1

The Pre-1952 Period: Muhammad Ali and the British Occupation

Egypt modernized its military forces along West European lines during the early 19th century, the first Middle Eastern country to do so. Most of the efforts of Muhammad Ali (1805-48)¹² to modernize the country were geared to the creation and support of a modern army that would rebuild Egypt's regional and international prestige and loosen the bonds of Ottoman overlordship. In search of manpower to fill the ranks of the new, modern army, native Egyptians were conscripted for the first time in many centuries. The Egyptian officer class was the first social group in Egypt to be influenced by modernism; the officers were the first to wear European dress, to adopt Western technology, and to learn European languages. Until 1882 the officer corps held a central position in society as its most progressive element—a social and psychological self-image that was not reasserted until the years preceding the coup in 1952. []

25X1

The British disbanded the existing politicized Army after they invaded and occupied Egypt in 1882; the succeeding British-led Egyptian military force became a prop for the monarchy during the more than half century of British rule, and the Egyptian officer class lost the premier social status and influential political position it had enjoyed earlier. The British succeeded so well in isolating the Army from the

25X1

¹² Muhammad Ali was the founder of the dynasty that ended with King Farouk (1936-52). []

general population that the military had no significant role in Egypt's national independence movement until the Free Officers' movement developed in the late 1930s. []

25X1

The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 settled diplomatic and security questions that had been left unresolved after Great Britain had declared "independence" for Egypt in 1922. The ruling Wafd Party strengthened the military and expanded the Military Academy so that more native Egyptians could become officers. Almost to a man the major conspirators of the 1952 coup—including Presidents Nasir and Sadat—were beneficiaries of an expanded enrollment of middle class youths in the Academy. This policy set in motion a process that led to a change in the social makeup of the officer corps and, ultimately, in its political outlook. []

25X1

1952-67: The Military Takes Charge

Background to the Coup. The plotters of the coup of 1952 were motivated primarily by their contempt for the corruption and incompetence of the monarchy and the Army's senior command, symbolized by the defeat by Israel in 1948 and the continued presence of British troops in Egypt after World War II. Broad social and political disparities underlay their concerns:

- Three percent of the population owned most of the land and monopolized political power.
- Eighty percent of the population was illiterate, and there was a wide gap between rich and poor.
- The native middle classes to which most Free Officers belonged were politically weak and ineffectual, whereas foreigners controlled important sectors of the economy. []

25X1

Most of the Free Officers had been politicized against the British presence and the inequities of Egyptian society by radical leftwing and rightwing opposition

Secret

Secret

groups, such as the Fascist-inspired Young Egypt Party and the Muslim Brotherhood, even before they had entered the Military Academy in the mid-1930s. As the domestic political situation deteriorated into massive rioting in the first half of 1952, the Free Officers quickly moved to execute their coup on 23 July 1952 before another civilian or military group could take power. []

25X1

The Military Oligarchy in Power

The Free Officer junta created a Revolutionary Command Council, placed a popular senior Army officer, General Naguib, at its head, and announced that political rule would eventually be turned over to civilians. In the power struggle that ensued between 1952 and 1954, Gamal Abd al-Nasir—who emerged as the leader of the junta—replaced Naguib, who had favored a return to a multiparty parliamentary democracy. []

25X1

By the end of 1954 the Free Officers had succeeded in destroying or discrediting all the principal sources of political legitimacy and institutions that predated the coup. They had completely rejected the old-style parliamentary democracy, eliminated the monarchy, disbanded political parties, and purged the military and civilian bureaucracies of potentially disloyal elements. []

25X1

By 1956 the Free Officers had institutionalized their rule with a constitution that created a presidential republic in which Gamal Abd al-Nasir as President had strong, centralized power. Egypt, however, was in reality a military oligarchy with Nasir at its head. The officer corps played the domestic role that a political party might otherwise have played. Former Free Officers who had resigned their commissions staffed the major governmental and political posts, while other former military officers provided a personnel pool to staff cabinet, ministry, and subministry positions. Loyal civilians were placed in technocratic roles where needed. Col. Abd al-Hakim Amer was the only Free Officer not to resign his commission. To ensure against the possibility of a counter coup, Nasir appointed Amer—a close personal friend as well as a popular personality in the armed forces—to be Armed

Forces Chief of Staff. As the overseer of the military in one capacity or another until 1967, Amer presided over the strongest political power center in the country. []

25X1

The officer corps became the vanguard for Nasir's "revolution from above" between 1952 and 1967 and, in contrast to the pre-1952 period, reaped the rewards of their elevated status—prestige, good pay, promotions, and access to civilian government positions after retirement. []

25X1

The 1967 Defeat: The Turning Point

The June war of 1967 with Israel marked a turning point in the fortunes of the Egyptian military. Its poor showing in the war—combined with previous failures at Suez in 1956, during the disintegration of the union with Syria in 1961, and during the intervention in the Yemeni civil war (1962-67)—dealt a devastating blow to its prestige. In the eyes of many Egyptians the armed forces had failed to justify their preeminent position in Egyptian society and the substantial economic resources they had received since the 1950s. []

25X1

Even though mass public demonstrations supported Nasir after the defeat, the armed forces continued to incur public antipathy. Nasir asked for the resignations of the entire military command, including Chief of Staff Amer, who by then was also Vice President. Nasir further disassociated himself from the June war failure by purging the military of all clients of Amer down to the middle-grade officer level. The officer corps had identified totally with the Nasir regime until 1967, and there had been no serious discontent or significant known conspiracies to unseat him. This first extensive purge since the 1950s, consequently, sent shockwaves through the military ranks. A coup attempt by Amer (who had had policy differences with Nasir long before the defeat in 1967) and a coterie of cashiered officers was averted when Amer was placed under house arrest. He committed suicide shortly thereafter. []

25X1

Secret

Secret

1968-73: Rebuilding the Armed Forces

The aftereffects of the military defeat and subsequent purge continued to undermine the political influence and social standing of the armed forces for several years as the military endured its greatest unrest and lowest morale since 1952. Nasir continued to use the military as scapegoats for the failures of the June war. The military trials of the numerous senior military officers arrested as "traitors" after the war remained on the front pages of Egyptian newspapers for well over a year. []

25X1

One major legacy of the defeat was the depoliticization of the military command. The senior command was now more specifically chosen for professional competence than for personal connections. No member of the senior command was allowed to accrue prestige or to build centers of power within the military similar to those that Amer had developed between 1954 and 1967. []

25X1

In line with the emphasis on professionalism, Nasir invited the Soviet Union—Egypt's major supplier of arms since the mid-1950s—to increase substantially the number both of in-country military advisers and of Egyptians training in the Soviet Union. The Soviets quickly reequipped the armed forces to their pre-1967 levels. []

25X1

Although the military remained the ultimate powerbroker after 1967, it had less direct daily influence on nonmilitary policy. Most of the original Free Officers were no longer in government, and those who had supported the Amer conspiracy had been purged. The number of military officers assigned to cabinet and ministerial posts declined, and the number of civilians rose. []

25X1

The role of the military command in Anwar Sadat's succession to the presidency after Nasir's death in 1970 was less pronounced than might normally be expected, largely because the military's position after its defeat in 1967 was so weakened. Prospective opposition feared that the Israelis might take advantage of a protracted competition for the presidency. Sadat's Army and Free Officer credentials, moreover, apparently offered more legitimacy than any candidate the military could nominate at the time. []

25X1

The military command, however, exercised more fully the powerbroker role in May 1971 when Sadat enlisted their support in his "Corrective Revolution" to counter a conspiracy against him from among Nasir's inner circle, which had continued to rule jointly with Sadat in a decisionmaking collegium. Sadat's popularity and independent style had alienated three members of the collegium—Vice President Ali Sabri, Head of Presidential Intelligence Sami Sharaf, and Minister of Interior Sharawi Gumma. Confident of the backing of the Chief of Staff and the military commanders, Sadat had all three men arrested along with coconspirator Minister of War Muhammad Fawzi and many others in the civilian bureaucracy and in Nasir's party, the Arab Socialist Union, who had supported the major conspirators. []

25X1

Nasir's policy of integrating Soviet advisers into Egyptian combat units, along with his stalemated policy of "no peace, no war" with Israel, generated the most serious military discontent during 1967-73. Because the Air Force, which had the poorest performance in the June war, especially resented the Soviet presence, it had the highest percentage of disgruntled officers and the most numerous coup conspiracies. By 1972 the hostility of officers in all of the services was reported to be so intense against the Soviet advisory presence that the Chief of Staff warned President Sadat that a coup was a strong possibility. Sadat expelled the Soviet advisers from Egypt in July 1972. []

25X1

Despite the mounting frustration within the military, coup plotting was consistently nipped in the bud during this period. Three major factors account for these failures: the extremely tight security that Nasir and Sadat placed within the armed forces; their policies that precluded the development of power centers in the military; and the hesitation of conspirators to act lest the Israelis take advantage of the disruption within the armed forces. []

25X1

Secret

Secret

Post-1973: The Military Regains Its Status

The October War with Israel, a major political victory for President Sadat, marked the emergence of the military from its six-year period of unrest and low morale. The armed forces, however, did not resume the prominent political role that they had played before 1967. Although former military officers still retained key cabinet and ministerial posts, Sadat continued to increase the number of civilians in those positions. Sadat, however, carefully addressed the military's grievances while ensuring that power centers and large client networks did not thrive and challenge his position.

25X1

Secret

Secret

Appendix C

Military Officers in Egyptian Cabinet Posts

The military increasingly dominated cabinet-level positions in the Egyptian Government between the coup in July 1952 and the Arab-Israeli war in 1967. Since then the trend has been reversed, as civilians have increasingly taken over cabinet positions formerly held by military officers. The Free Officers who engineered the 1952 coup and who later formed the Revolutionary Command Council endorsed civilian domination of the early postcoup cabinets while they consolidated their power behind the scenes. When the Presidential Republic was proclaimed in June 1953, the first of Egypt's four military presidents, Gen. Muhammad Naguib, formed a civilian government. Gamal Abd al-Nasir was named Deputy Prime Minister under Naguib. []

25X1

The Nasir Era

Nasir organized his own cabinet when he became Prime Minister in April 1954; five months later military officers—recruited from among Free Officers and others who had supported the coup—held more than half of the positions in his government. In all of Nasir's cabinets from 1954 until his death in 1970, military officers held all top positions (Nasir's five prime ministers were all military officers), between one-third and two-thirds of the cabinet positions, and key posts within the ministries. Even ministries nominally headed by civilians were controlled by military officers. One of the most military-dominated was the Interior Ministry, where by 1961 more than 3,400 of the 4,100 employees were either active duty or retired officers. []

25X1

The Sadat Era

Anwar Sadat, like Nasir a member of the Free Officers' Executive Committee and former member of the Revolutionary Command Council, continued the dramatic reduction of military officers in cabinet posts that Nasir had begun after the June war. Of the 207 officials who served as cabinet officials under Sadat during his 11-year rule, only 44 were military

officers. Of these, about one-third were members of the Free Officers' Association, and almost one-fifth were graduates of the Military Academy's class of 1939. Sadat dismissed the last of the Free Officers from his cabinet in 1975; Sadat himself was the last of the Free Officers to hold a cabinet post. In contrast to the policies of Nasir, all of Sadat's prime ministers and more than half of his deputy prime ministers were civilians. (Other than himself—he served as his own Prime Minister on two occasions.) Under Sadat military officers dominated only two cabinet posts: the defense minister was always a military officer, and three out of four vice presidents were military officers.


25X1

Even during periods of internal or external crisis, Sadat did not turn to the military to take over his cabinet. The military representation in his cabinet frequently decreased in response to government crises:

- Sadat started a partial purge of military officials from his cabinet following the coup plot against him in May 1971, cutting their number by more than half by January 1972.
- Although he shuffled his cabinet following the ouster of Soviet advisers in 1972, he did not bring in more military officials.
- Sadat named himself Prime Minister in March 1973 and almost doubled the number of military officers in his cabinet. Even so, only a little more than one-fourth of his war cabinet of October 1973 were military officers. By contrast, two-thirds of Nasir's 1967 war cabinet had been military men. Within six months after the October War the process of civilianizing the cabinet resumed.

Secret

Figure 7
Military Composition of Selected
Egyptian Cabinets, 1952-81



- The same trend toward civilian dominance continued following the cabinet shuffles that took place before Sadat's historic trip to Jerusalem in November 1977 and after the peace treaty with Israel was signed in March 1979.

- Sadat increased slightly the number of military cabinet officers in his cabinet shuffle in May 1980 (while the total number of cabinet positions dropped by six). His appointment of war hero Gen. Kamal Hasan Ali as Foreign Minister followed a series of three civilian resignations from that post between November 1977 and May 1980.

25X1

Little information is available on the extent of military influence at the subministerial level. We do not know, for example, the extent to which President Mubarak or other top military officials in the cabinet such as Foreign Minister Kamal Hasan Ali have placed their former military colleagues in positions within the bureaucracy. Nor do we know the extent to which retired military officers staff the bureaucracy or to what extent military officials of the Nasir era continue to serve in it.

25X1

25X1

586230 3-82

Secret

25X1

Page Denied

Secret

Secret